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THE PRAGMATIC DISAPPOINTMENT OF STATE 
PREEMPTION: THE 2016 DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT 
AND ITS FAILURE TO PROTECT EMPLOYEE 
WHISTLEBLOWERS FROM FEDERAL COMPUTER CRIME 
LAW 
Kristine Craig† 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the first reported trade secret case, Vickery v. Welch, which was decided 
by the Supreme Court in 1837, trade secret law and enforcement has existed 
exclusively in state law statutes and common law doctrines.1  Yet, on May 16, 2016, 
over 150 years since Vickery, President Barack Obama signed the Defend Trade 
Secrets Act (“DTSA”) into law as an amendment to the Economic Espionage Act 
(“EEA”).2  In addition to providing a federal claim of relief for misappropriation, the 
text of the DTSA contains a provision that provides immunity for whistleblowers 
from trade secret misappropriation liability.  However, the immunity provision is not 
sufficient on its face for the protection of whistleblowers as intended by the DTSA’s 
authors.  The provision does nothing to define how far whistleblowers can go in 
accessing incriminating information, which is integral to encouraging disclosure and 
assuring whistleblowers of immunity under the DTSA.  Furthermore, the immunity 
provision does not extinguish liability for violation of computer access laws, which 
directly govern the scope of authorized access to employer data or information.   
Because the definition of lawful computer access under the federal Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) is fairly limited in scope, the DTSA provides a false 
sense of security to whistleblowers who are reassured by a broad grant of immunity, 
but also subtly warned about an unspecified number of related laws with enormous 
potential for liability.  By contrast, state computer access laws, such as the California 
Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act (“CDAFA”) and N.Y. Penal 
Law § 156.00, provide broader protections for whistleblowers.  These statutes are in 
alignment with the purpose and history of DTSA because they allocate liability only 
 
†  Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2019; B.A. Political Science and 
Economics, University of California, Davis, 2016.  I would like to extend my sincerest thanks to Professor 
Stephen Yelderman (University of Notre Dame Law School) for his guidance and direction throughout the 
writing process, and the editors of the Journal of Legislation, especially James Britton.  I would also like to 
thank my mom, Ketty, sister Juliana, and my dearest friends. 
 1  Harry First, Trade Secrets and Antitrust Law, 910 (N.Y.U Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 255, 2011), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765244. 
 2  Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (2016). 
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where whistleblowers access material in malicious and intentional ways, such as 
hacking.  
This Note is divided into six parts.  After assessing the emergence and features 
of the DTSA in Parts I and II, this paper will explore the Congressional intent of 
DTSA immunity in Part III.  Next, Part IV discusses the practical problems with the 
immunity provision and is divided into two sections.  Section 1 discusses 
whistleblower protection under state and federal computer access statutes, and 
Section 2 discusses emerging case law on the functionality of the immunity provision 
in litigation.  Part V considers solutions to practical problems with the provision, and 
Part VI concludes the main proposals in this Note.  
I. EMERGENCE OF THE DTSA 
In the 1990s, rapidly advancing technology solidified confidence in the patent 
law system as an attractive and agreeable option for protecting commercially 
valuable products.3  Monopolistic property rights granted by the patent law system 
were regarded as a worthy benefit in exchange for public disclosure of the claimed 
invention.  Inventors’ exclusive property rights under patent law allowed them to 
enter licensing agreements in return for royalties, or acquire the sole profits from the 
sale of their invention.  Due to the fact that the subject matter of inventions during 
the 1990s was often useful and applicable to a wide range of industries (i.e. 
computers, software, DVD/CDs, text messaging), inventions proved to be 
enormously profitable for inventors, and also useful to the public and essential to 
improving quality of life.  
The patent system’s requirement of eventual public disclosure came with clear 
societal advantages, the most obvious example in the case of medicine and drug 
advances.  However, nearly two decades after the technology boom of the 1990s, 
technological developments slowed and became more refined.4  Made possible by 
development of the modern computer, expansive industries formed around “app” 
development and computer programming, highlighting the value of computer 
technology to customize digital devices for consumers.5  As a fundamental building 
block, the computer was a centerpiece of innovation upon which further technology 
focused, and a main contributor to the refinement of innovation over time.  Because 
a vast amount of technological innovation today no longer deals with fundamentals, 
I propose that it has become oriented towards consumers with disposable income.  
For this reason, benefits to society from public disclosure of new technology became 
marginally lower over time.  The marginal benefit to the public from disclosure of 
“the useful arts” declined, and the secrecy of “the useful arts,” supported by trade 
secret protection, became fundamentally valuable to companies in the form of 
comparative advantages and competition in the market via product advancement.   
 
 3  U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 19632015, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2018). 
 4  See David Rotman, Tech Slowdown Threatens the American Dream, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 6, 2016), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601199/tech-slowdown-threatens-the-american-dream/. 
 5  Catherine Clifford, By 2017, the App Market Will Be a $77 Billion Industry (Infographic), 
ENTREPRENEUR (Aug. 26, 2014), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/236832. 
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Furthermore, as confirmed by a boom in litigation, scholarly attention, and 
legislation, the benefit of trade secrets to companies is clear.6  As David S. Almeling, 
Counsel at O’Melveny & Myers LLP, hypothesizes: a mobile workforce, the rising 
value of intellectual property, and trade secret’s flexible definition fueled the ascent 
of trade secrets in recent years.7  I propose that these reasons, combined with the 
greater marginal value companies gain from concealing their information, has 
lessened attraction to the patent law system and its disclosure requirement.  Inventors 
have turned towards trade secret law instead.  
Additionally, the availability of legal protection during the early research and 
development stages of a product—that trade secret law exclusively provides—makes 
it a comparatively better option than patent law to companies.8  The popularity of 
trade secrets that flows from the availability of protection during the research and 
development phase is clear, especially when considering the fragility of inventive 
activity and critical early months of start-ups and venture capitalist incubation 
initiatives.  During these periods, ideas and early inventive activity are hot 
commodities, with great potential for misappropriation in tight-knit communities 
such as Silicon Valley and the San Francisco Bay Area.9  This change in the 
innovative landscape after the 1990s paved the way for federal recognition of trade 
secrets through the DTSA. 
II. FEATURES OF THE DTSA 
The story of the DTSA began with the passage of the Economic Espionage Act 
(“EEA”) in 1996.10  The EEA sought to increase protection and provide remedies for 
theft of trade secrets by foreign governments and agents.  However, because the EEA 
did not contain a federal private cause of action, increasing enforcement and 
protection required action of the federal government to initiate a lawsuit.  Given the 
enormous amount of prosecutorial discretion within the U.S. Attorney’s Office, trade 
secret misappropriation cases could easily be subordinated to those of corporate 
abuse, fraud, or tax avoidance.  Yet, President Obama’s adoption of the DTSA in 
2016 marked the advent of the first federal codification of trade secret law and created 
a federal cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.11  
 
 6  David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly Important, 27 BERKELEY 
TECH. L. J. 1091 (2012), https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https:// 
www.bing.com/&httpsredir=1&art-icle =1958&context=btlj 
 7  Id. at 1091. 
 8  Georgi Paskalev & Benoit Yelle, Trade Secrets Made Practical - Pt. 2, MONDAQ (Sept. 15, 2017), 
http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/630854/Trade+Secrets/Trade+Secrets+Made+Practical+Part+2 (explaining 
the benefits that trade secret law provided, in comparison to patent, particularly regarding the maturity of the 
invention or idea). 
 9  Peter Holley, Tech Titans, Trade Secrets and Alleged Conspiracy: Inside the Waymo-Uber Battle 
Captivating Silicon Valley, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2018/02/04/tech-titans-trade-secrets-and-alleged-
conspiracy-inside-the-waymo-uber-battle-captivating-silicon-valley/?utm_term=.a5c6e52a74b0 (referring to 
Silicon Valley as “the wildly aspirational, incestuous, high-tech valley”). 
10  Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1831 
(2012)). 
11  Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 18 U.S.C.S § 1832 et seq. (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-137). 
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Trade secrets, under U.S. law, are established by a three-part test: (1) the 
information must be non–public; (2) reasonable measures are taken to protect that 
information; and (3) the underlying information derives independent economic value 
from not being publicly known.12  Under the meaning of Defend Trade Secrets Act: 
the term ‘trade secret’ means all forms and types of financial, business, 
scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including 
patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, 
prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or 
codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, 
compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, 
photographically, or in writing.13 
 
Further, trade secret misappropriation is defined as an: 
(A) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has 
reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or 
(B) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied 
consent by a person who . . . used 1) improper means to acquire it, 2) knew 
or should’ve know that it was derived from a person who used improper 
means or 3) knew that the trade secret was a trade secret and it had been 
acquired by mistake before the person’s position changed.14 
 
With the creation of a federal private cause of action in the DTSA, Congress 
authorized those who were harmed by a misappropriation to take legal action in 
federal court and protect themselves.  Language in the statute explains that courts 
may order injunctions against violators to prevent “actual or threatened 
misappropriation,” so long as the order does not “otherwise conflict with an 
applicable State law prohibiting restraints on the practice of a lawful profession, 
trade, or business.”15  Moreover, 
[e]xcept as provided in section 1833(b), this chapter shall not be construed 
to preempt or displace any other remedies, whether civil or criminal, 
provided by United States Federal, State, commonwealth, possession, or 
territory law for the misappropriation of a trade secret, or to affect the 
otherwise lawful disclosure of information by any Government employee 
 
12  See Mark L. Krotoski, Common Issues and Challenges in Prosecuting Trade Secret and Economic 
Espionage Act Cases, 57 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 2 (2009); 18 U.S.C.S § 1839(3); Id. § 1839(3)(A); Id. 
§ 1839(3)(B). 
13  18 U.S.C.S § 1839(3) (LexisNexis through Pub. L. No. 115-137). 
14  Id. § 1839(5). 
15  Id. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i). 
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under section 552 of title 5 (commonly known as the Freedom of 
Information Act).16   
 
This language makes clear that the statute suggests no preemption of state law 
through the Supremacy Clause for trade secret misappropriation claims.  Rather, state 
and federal law coexist.  
In addition to a federal cause of action, Congress carved out an exception to trade 
secret protection and enforcement against whistleblowers under the DTSA, requiring 
that  
[a]n individual shall not be held criminally or civilly liable under any 
Federal or State trade secret law for the disclosure of a trade secret that (A) 
is made (i) in confidence to a Federal, State, or local government official, 
either directly or indirectly, or to an attorney; (ii) solely for the purpose of 
reporting or investigating a suspected violation of law.17  
 
Additionally, immunity would apply for disclosures made in a complaint or other 
filing, but only if “made under seal.”18  Importantly, a rule of construction was 
established, stating: “Except as expressly provided for under this subsection, nothing 
in this subsection shall be construed to authorize, or limit liability for, an act that is 
otherwise prohibited by law, such as the unlawful access of material by unauthorized 
means.”19  
The issue of whistleblower immunity arises often when the government enlists 
employee assistance in revealing confidential information to attorneys or government 
investigators in good faith.  During lawsuits initiated by the federal government 
against employers, which are made possible by the help of employees, the disclosure 
of an employer’s trade secret in the process is certainly possible.  In exchange for 
efforts to disclose information to the government (containing either an employer’s 
misappropriation of another company’s trade secret or an employer’s own trade 
secrets), the DTSA grants mandatory immunity to employees from retaliatory trade 
secret misappropriation claims by employers.  The most aggressive form of lawsuits 
are called “qui tam” actions, which are filed by an individual on behalf of the 
government, and are empowered by Section 3730(b) of the False Claims Act 
(“FCA”).20  Recognizing the importance of a whistleblower’s function in society, 
“Section 3730(b)(2) provides that a qui tam complaint must be filed with the court 
under seal.  The complaint and a written disclosure of all the relevant information 
 
16  Id. § 1838. 
17  Id. § 1833(b)(1). 
18  Id. 
19  Id. § 1833(b)(5). 
20  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: A PRIMER 23 (2011), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf. 
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known to the relator must be served on the U.S. Attorney for the judicial district 
where the qui tam was filed and on the Attorney General of the United States.”21  
This is consistent with the scheme Congress imagined when enacting the DTSA 
immunity provision.  As reflected in the DTSA text, for the disclosure to qualify for 
immunity, it must be made “(i) in confidence to a Federal, State, or local government 
official, either directly or indirectly, or to an attorney; and (ii) solely for the purpose 
of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of law.”22  Congress has 
acknowledged the important function that employees can play in revealing illegal 
conduct for over a century, most notably in passing the FCA during the Civil War.23  
However, throughout history, limits placed on the scope of employee activity have 
been important to the functionality of whistleblowing regimes.  Some scholars and 
legal professionals, such as Robert B. Milligan, suggest upon analyzing Sarbanes-
Oxley whistleblowing cases that “special attention should be given to the employee’s 
specific potential whistleblower claims as certain claims . . . may provide protection 
to take [c]ompany documents (or at a minimum divulge [c]ompany information), 
particularly if such information is shared with the SEC.” 24 
Historically, Congressional focus in qui tam actions has been on protecting the 
trade secret itself, and much less on protecting those who assist the government by 
disclosing it.  Congress made clear, prior to the DTSA, that protective orders on trade 
secrets must be in place during criminal cases in each stage of the prosecution.  Yet 
these protective orders failed to address employee concerns directly, despite the 
enormous value that promoting useful disclosures may contribute.  Instead of aiming 
to strike a balance in light of the need for whistleblower assistance in disclosing 
fraudulent practices, legislative efforts were concentrated more on protecting trade 
secret confidentiality.  Because of the risk that turning over trade secret information 
to the federal government would result in retaliation by their employer, employee 
whistleblowers were uneasy about assisting the government in qui tam lawsuits at all.  
Until the DTSA, employee whistleblowers continued to face strong concerns about 
personal legal consequences.   
Overall, the DTSA strikes a balance between protecting the legitimate ownership 
of company trade secrets by providing a federal cause of action for relief, while at 
the same time enhancing law enforcement activities by protecting whistleblowers.  
Especially because the inherent value of a trade secret stems from the fact that they 
are, by definition, kept secret, potentially significant losses are at risk in the 
furtherance of any lawsuit.  Yet despite the risk that trade secrets may be exposed 
without revealing illegal conduct, Congress decided that the public and private 
benefits from exposing potential fraud in qui tam actions were greater than potential 
losses.  Furthermore, because enlisting the assistance of employees as quasi-public 
actors is sometimes the only way to gather information regarding potential abuse or 
 
21  Id. 
22  18 U.S.C.S § 1833 (b)(1) (LexisNexis through Pub. L. No. 115-137). 
23  Joel D Hesch. Breaking the Siege: Restoring Equity and Statutory Intent to the Process of Determining 
Qui Tam Relator Awards Under the False Claims Act, 29 T. M. COOLEY L. REV. 217, 283 (2012). 
24  Robert B. Milligan, An Employee Is Stealing Company Documents…That Can’t Be Protected Activity, 
Right?, TRADING SECRETS (July 3, 2013), https://www.tradesecretslaw.com/2013/07/articles/ trade-secrets/an-
employee-is-stealing-company-documentsthat-cant-be-protected-activity-right/ (emphasis added). 
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fraud by employers, the functionality of this immunity clause is key to carrying out 
the DTSA authors’ intent. 
III. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
Whistleblowers as quasi-public actors are essential playing pieces in the broader 
scheme of law enforcement and serve as important checks on corporations with 
concentrated power.  As Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Charles Grassley, a 
co-sponsor of the whistleblower immunity provision, explained: 
Too often, individuals who come forward to report wrongdoing in the 
workplace are punished for simply telling the truth.  The amendment I 
championed with Senator Leahy ensures that these whistleblowers won’t 
be slapped with allegations of trade secret theft when responsibly exposing 
misconduct.  It’s another way we can prevent retaliation and even 
encourage people to speak out when they witness violations of the law.25   
 
Fellow co-sponsor, Senator Leahy, added, “Whistleblowers serve an essential 
role in ensuring accountability.  It is important that whistleblowers have strong and 
effective avenues to come forward without fear of intimidation or retaliation.  The 
amendment I authored with Senator Grassley takes another important step in our 
bipartisan efforts to protect whistleblowers and promote accountability.”26 
The immunity provision was created through a bipartisan amendment to the 
DTSA and co-authored by Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Senator Charles 
Grassley, R-Iowa, and Senator Patrick Leahy, D-Vt.  In the abstract, the purpose of 
immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 1833 is to prevent companies from using the threat of a 
trade secret suit or a breach of a non-disclosure agreement to stifle legitimate 
whistleblowing.27  It also serves to mitigate concerns of whistleblowers and provide 
a clear message that motivates employees to come forward with essential information 
to assist the federal government in the furtherance of a qui tam law suit.  
Notably, the bipartisan support for the whistleblowing amendment speaks to the 
agreement among the parties on the value of immunity for legitimate whistleblowing 
activity.  At an executive business meeting of the full Senate Judiciary Committee, 
on January 28, 2016, the bill’s Democratic Co-Sponsor, Patrick Leahy, thanked 
Chairman Grassley for “working with [him] on an amendment to provide needed 
protections for whistleblowers who share confidential information in the course of 
reporting suspected illegal activity to law enforcement or when filing a lawsuit, 
 
25  Press Release, U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, Leahy-Grassley Amendment to Protect Whistleblowers 
Earns Unanimous Support in Judiciary Committee (Jan. 28, 2016), available at 
https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-grassley-amendment-to-protect-whistleblowers_earns-unanimous-
support-in-judiciary-committee. 
26  Id. (emphasis added). 
27  Randall E. Kahnke et al., Key Trade Secret Developments Of 2017: Part 1, LAW 360 (Dec. 21, 2017), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/996861/key-trade-secret-developments-of-2017-part-1. 
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provided they do so under seal.”28  Leahy added that “[o]ur amendment is supported 
by the Government Accountability Project and the Project on Government Oversight 
(“POGO”), and I look forward to its adoption.”29 
IV. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE DTSA’S FUNCTIONALITY 
In addition to a federal cause of action and immunity provision, the DTSA 
mandates notice for employees in their employment contract of immunity from 
retaliation in the form of threats of lawsuits for state or federal trade secret 
misappropriation.  In 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1) and § 1833(b)(5), the DTSA states 
required text to be included in all contracts:  
An individual shall not be held criminally or civilly liable under any 
Federal or State trade secret law for the disclosure of a trade secret that 
(A) is made (i) in confidence to a Federal, State, or local government 
official, either directly or indirectly, or to an attorney; and (ii) solely for 
the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of law; or 
(B) is made in a complaint or other document filed in a lawsuit or other 
proceeding, if such filing is made under seal.30 
 
Section (b)(3) requires notice of this immunity to be given in an employee’s 
contract and “applies only to contracts and agreements entered into after May 11, 
2016, the effective date of DTSA.”31  
Many politicians, including Senator Dianne Feinstein, have emphasized this as 
the highlight of the legislation.32  However, the text of the statute is much more 
complex than it first appears.  Section (b)(5) reflects that “[e]xcept as expressly 
provided for under this subsection, nothing in this subsection shall be construed to 
authorize, or limit liability for, an act that is otherwise prohibited by law, such as the 
unlawful access of material by unauthorized means.”33  A clear interpretation of 
Section (b)(5) reflects that the immunity provided in the notice requirement grants 
protection solely from claims under federal and state trade secret law.  It does not 
provide protection to actions taken by the whistleblower employee, such as a 
violation of computer access or computer crime laws, which directly govern the scope 
of authorized access to employer data or information.  Specifically, the DTSA does 
not provide further guidance on the domain of authorized access or scope of this 
whistleblower immunity, and federal law is less than clear.  
 
28  Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy, U.S. COMM. JUDICIARY (Jan. 28, 2016), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/1-28-16-leahy-statement. 
29  Id. 
30  18 U.S.C.S. § 1833(b)(1) (LexisNexis through Pub. L. No. 115-137). 
31  26 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 6.02 (LexisNexis through Dec. 2017). 
32  James Pooley, What You Need to Know About the Amended Defend Trade Secrets Act, PATENTLYO 
(Jan. 31, 2016), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/01/amended-defend-secrets.html. 
33  18 U.S.C.S § 1833(b)(5) (LexisNexis through Pub. L. No. 115-137). 
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Persistent circuit splits on federal computer crime statutes such as the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), which governs information an employee can access 
or actions an employee can take to uncover fraud, still exist.  The circuit splits, 
considered in combination with the low thresholds for liability under the CFAA, 
complicate the picture and compromise the functionality of DTSA immunity.  
Furthermore, the mandatory notice requirement in an employee’s employment 
contract also fails to disclose what activities qualify for this immunity and what 
activities do not.  Derivative reliance on the absence of defined criminal activity by 
statutes with unclear authority puts this supposed “notice” of immunity on shaky 
footing.  Without defining the scope of lawful activities for a potential employee 
whistleblower, the immunity provision of the DTSA is an attempt at best to 
encourage employee whistleblowers to come forward.  The failure of the DTSA to 
fully protect whistleblowers from aggressive and restrictive forms of computer access 
laws is an essential impediment to safe exercise of whistleblowing under the DTSA’s 
immunity.  Because of this, qui tam lawsuits that rely on the assistance of employees 
to reveal fraudulent activity to the public and keep companies accountable are likely 
to be fatally undermined.  
Despite the ambiguity latent in the statute, room for salvation certainly exists.  
Although the trade secret misappropriation provision does not preempt state law, the 
whistleblower immunity provision does result in a narrow preemption of state law.  
This is evinced by the text of Section (b)(1), which requires notice to employees and 
grants immunity “under any Federal or State trade secret law,” thus sweeping in and 
including immunity under state trade secret law and state law governing non-
disclosure agreements.  Practically, this means that even when asserting a cause of 
action against an employee whistleblower under state law, an immunity provision for 
whistleblowers exists.  It remains necessary to show evidence of prerequisites to 
immunity: namely that the disclosure is 1) made in confidence to a federal, state, or 
local government official, or to an attorney, and is solely for the purpose of reporting 
or investigating a suspected violation of law, or (2) under seal in a complaint for a 
lawsuit.34  Once established, immunity from state trade secret misappropriation 
claims is in place, and therefore a retaliating employer may look to assert violations 
of computer access laws instead.   
Every state has their own version of the federal CFAA, or some form of criminal 
computer act,35 with clearer guidance than federal law on the domain of access and 
enhanced protection for whistleblowers.  Given that the whistleblower immunity 
provision of DTSA preempts state law and adds an immunity requirement, this 
combination of legal claims (immunity by the DTSA and state computer access law) 
is an ideal relationship compared with federal computer access law.  Together, these 
statutes operate practically to carry out the intent of Congress and ensure full 
functionality of the incentive system put in place: which is ultimately aimed at getting 
employees to come forward.  When the practical details of what action an employee 
may take to exercise this immunity are unpacked, employees encounter two related 
 
34  Id. § 1833 (b)(1). 
35  JONATHAN MAYER, THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT AND STATE COMPUTER CRIME LAWS 
(2014), available at https://stanford.edu/~jmayer/law696/summaries/CFAA.pdf. 
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doctrines of law and potential liability outside of trade secret law—namely, the 
federal CFAA and state computer crime laws. 
A. Computer Access Law Under State Statutes Provides More Protection for 
Employee Whistleblowers 
State computer crime and access law, such as the California Comprehensive 
Computer Data Access and Fraud Act (“CDAFA”) and N.Y. Penal Law § 156.00, 
provide the necessary protection for legitimate whistleblowing activity that is 
authorized under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”).  In contrast, federal 
computer crime and access law under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) 
is much less promising.  Due to the fact that the CDAFA, N.Y. Penal Law § 156.00, 
and the CFAA each provide a private cause of action for employers, examining the 
impact of whistleblower liability from these statutes is fundamental to understanding 
the larger picture of whistleblowing the DTSA imagines. 
1. State Computer Crime Statutes 
In Kewanee Oil v. Bicron, nearly forty years ago, the Supreme Court reasoned 
that “Congress, by its silence over these many years, has seen the wisdom of allowing 
the States to enforce trade secret protection.”36  Along this rationale, state-led trade 
secret litigation has remained a historic cornerstone in intellectual property disputes.  
Yet, given preemptive effect of the whistleblower provision of the federal Defend 
Trade Secrets Act on state trade secret law, it is essential to examine the text of state 
statutes such as computer crime, trade secret, and state non-disclosure agreement law.   
The underlying conduct involved in a whistleblowing situation often overlaps 
and implicates both trade secret law and computer crime law.  Imagine an employee 
who discovers fraudulent information on a company computer and turns over files 
that may contain protected trade secret information.  Yet, because the immunity 
provision applies to causes of action under trade secret law, employers often seek 
alternative channels of liability exclusively under computer crime law, to which no 
immunity applies.37  Therefore, the very same conduct that benefits from immunity 
under trade secret liability, does not benefit from immunity under computer access 
law, creating a fundamental disconnect in achieving a working incentive system for 
whistleblowers.  For these reasons, sensible thresholds for liability under computer 
access law must also be in place, to ensure that the whistleblowing function in society 
is preserved.  As we will explore below, these thresholds for liability vary greatly 
between federal and state computer crime law. 
 
36  Bruce A. Wessel & Harry Mittleman, Here’s What You Need to Know About the Defend Trade Secrets 
Act, RECORDER (Apr. 27, 2016, 5:54 PM), https://www.law.com/therecorder/almID/1202756170494/heres-
what-you-need-to-know-about-the-defend-trade-secrets-act/ (citing Kewanee Oil v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470 
(1974)). 
37  The text of the DTSA makes clear that “nothing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize, or 
limit liability for, an act that is otherwise prohibited by law, such as the unlawful access of material by 
unauthorized means.” 18 U.S.C.S § 1833(b)(5) (LexisNexis through Pub. L. No. 115-137). 
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Even before the federal CFAA’s enactment in 1986, many states had their own 
computer crime laws, although some waited for guidance from the CFAA before 
enacting their own.38  Because of the high volume of intellectual property litigation 
in California, this paper will focus on the California Comprehensive Computer Data 
Access and Fraud Act (“CDAFA”), as codified in California Penal Code Section 502, 
and compare it with other state computer crime laws.  Upon examining these state 
laws, the consequences of federal preemption of state law become apparent. 
a. California Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act 
The quintessential “whistleblowing situation” the Defend Trade Secrets Act 
contemplates, where an employee suspects a wrongdoing that prompts an internal 
investigation, begs the questions of what, where, and how that employee can gain 
information to bring forth as evidence without triggering personal liability.  Yet the 
DTSA fails to distinguish these crucial details.  Instead, it contains a catch-all clause, 
instructing employees to abide by other applicable laws or face liability.39  Therefore, 
seeking guidance from state computer crime law is made necessary.  While the 
boundaries of what, where, and how are unclear under the federal CFAA (as we will 
see in subsequent sections), the CDAFA’s guiding case law from California state 
courts and the U.S. Northern District of California create whistleblower-friendly 
thresholds and clear guidelines. 
The CDAFA, which is codified in California Penal Code § 502, contains many 
similar, but a few relevant and distinct provisions as compared to the CFAA.40  For 
instance, the CDAFA imposes liability on a person who “[k]nowingly accesses and 
without permission takes, copies, or makes use of any data from a computer, 
computer system, or computer network, or takes or copies any supporting 
documentation, whether existing or residing internal or external to a computer, 
computer system, or computer network.”41  In NovelPoster v. Javitch Canfield 
GroupParties, the Court reasoned that parties act “without permission” within the 
meaning of California law and the CDAFA when they “circumvent technical or code-
based barriers in place to restrict or bar a user’s access.”42  Such circumvention of 
technical barriers may commonly be referred to as “hacking.”  In Sunbelt Rentals Inc. 
v. Victor, the absence of facts showing an alleged violator circumvented technical or 
code-based barriers led the Northern District of California to dismiss the claim under 
the CDAFA (California Penal Code § 502).  The hacking requirement is compelling 
from a policy perspective, because it requires a showing of clear disregard for privacy 
and morally culpable behavior.  Additionally, requiring hacking activity narrows the 
scope of liability to specific acts that an employee would be unlikely to 
 
38  MAYER, supra note 30. 
39  18 U.S.C.S § 1833(b)(5) (LexisNexis through Pub. L. No. 115-137). 
40  CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (Deering 2017). 
41  Id. § 502(c)(2). 
42  NovelPoster v. Javitch Canfield Grp., 140 F.Supp.3d 938, 950 (N.D. Cal 2014) (quoting Facebook v. 
Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.Supp.2d 1025, 1036 (N.D.Cal. 2012)); see also Sunbelt Rentals v. Victor, 43 
F.Supp.3d 1026, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing claim under Section 502 where party failed to allege facts 
showing alleged violator circumvented technical or code-based barriers). 
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unintentionally take.  In this Note, we will see that the California state CDAFA and 
federal CFAA diverge on this important outer-bound of liability.   
Furthermore, the scope of the authorized access that employees can engage in 
when collecting incriminating evidence is defined by the exception from liability of 
the CDAFA.  In Sections (h)(1) and (h)(2), liability is exempted for “any acts which 
are committed by a person within the scope of his or her lawful employment.”43  
Further, “[f]or purposes of this section, a person acts within the scope of his or her 
employment when he or she performs acts which are reasonably necessary to the 
performance of his or her work assignment.”44  In Chrisman v. City of Los Angeles, 
the Court held that “an employer’s disapproval of an employee’s conduct does not 
cast the conduct outside the scope of employment.”45  It went on further to describe 
that “[i]f the employer’s disapproval were the measure, then virtually any misstep, 
mistake, or misconduct by an employee involving an employer’s computer would, 
by respondents’ reasoning, be criminal.”46  This is in sharp contrast to the CFAA, 
which focuses on the employer’s disapproval.  
To illustrate, the court in Chrisman poses a hypothetical under the CFAA’s 
approach: if an employer prohibited employees from logging onto the Internet to 
check their personal email, respondents’ definition of scope of employment would 
make reading one’s email on company time a crime even where the employee read 
the email on a computer regularly assigned to that employee.  In Chrisman, the Court 
relied on general interpretations of what “within the scope of employment” means to 
support their interpretation of the CDAFA.47  The Court in Chrisman cites a general 
example in Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., where the California Supreme 
Court agreed that the employer disapproval is not the measure of the scope of 
employment.48  In Perez, the court reasoned that, even though a child was hurt while 
riding a tractor with his uncle, in violation of company rules, the uncle was still within 
the scope of employment “because he was working for his employer while operating 
the tractor.”49  Although Perez dealt with a personal injury action, the Court in 
Chrisman relied on it to expound the California Supreme Court’s general 
interpretation of scope of employment, and apply it for purposes of the CDAFA’s 
liability exemption.  The Court in Chrisman ultimately held that under the CDAFA, 
the “scope of employment” exception of the statute prohibiting unauthorized 
computer access is not limited to “legitimate job-related conduct.”50  In other words, 
exemption from liability could be found even for conduct in contravention of an 
employment policy, because the scope of employment is not defined by employer’s 
disapproval of an activity.  The CDAFA expands coverage to any act within the scope 
of employment, regardless of the act’s legitimacy from the employer’s perspective.  
By refusing to hedge liability on the employer’s terms, the employer’s control over 
 
43  CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(h) (Deering 2017) 
44  Id. § 502(h)(1). 
45  Chrisman v. City of Los Angeles, 155 Cal. App. 4th 29, 37 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
46  Id. at 37. 
47  Id. at 36. 
48  Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., 41 Cal.3d 962, 969 (Cal. 1986). 
49  Id. at 967–70; see also Chrisman, 155 Cal. App. 4th at 36. 
50  Chrisman v. City of Los Angeles, 155 Cal. App. 4th 29, 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
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the ability of their employees to discover wrongdoings is dramatically reduced, and 
the security of the employee whistleblower is elevated. 
Everything considered, the standards of the CDAFA are good policy.  At the 
same time that they protect the legitimate conduct of whistleblowers from liability 
under computer crime law, they do not protect those who engage in fishing 
expeditions.  This aligns with the DTSA’s goal of balancing trade secret protection 
with whistleblower protection, because the CDAFA only exempts whistleblowers 
who accessed the information within the scope of what was reasonable to their work 
activities, and does not hedge liability on employer policy.  In addition, it does not 
provide incentives to employees to look outside their daily activities for information 
and waste time monitoring their employer, because these activities are not covered 
by the CDAFA’s liability exemption.  
b. New York Penal Law § 156 
Although California boasts the largest state population by far, New York comes 
close to matching the number of Fortune 500 companies headquartered within the 
state.51  Not surprisingly, California, New York, and Texas house nearly one third of 
America’s top companies and sixty-four percent of all Fortune 500 company 
headquarters.52  With this in mind, examining relevant New York state statutes 
available to employers for claims against employee whistleblowers is fundamental to 
understanding the full scope of considerations that may impact an employee’s 
willingness to speak up regarding employer wrongdoings. 
Like California, state computer access and crime laws in New York provide 
sufficient protection for whistleblowers, in alignment with the balance the DTSA 
intends to strike between protecting company trade secrets and punishing fraud.  
Under N.Y. Penal Law § 156.00, criminal access to a computer “without 
authorization” is defined as “access[ing] a computer, computer service or computer 
network without the permission of the owner.”53  This requires that the offender had 
actual, not merely constructive, notice of a revocation of permission, yet proceeded 
regardless.54  Paragraph 8 of the statute emphasizes that “[p]roof that such person 
used or accessed a computer . . . through the knowing use of a set of instructions, 
code or computer program that bypasses, defrauds or otherwise circumvents a 
security measure. . . .  Such action would be presumptive evidence that such person 
used or accessed such computer, computer service or computer network without 
authorization.”55  The presumption of liability from an act of “hacking” is distinctly 
the line where the CDAFA also seeks to draw liability for potential whistleblowers.  
Emphasizing hacking to gain unlawful access, over exceeding already authorized 
access, is the best way to protect legitimate whistleblowing.  In practice commentary 
for N.Y. Penal Law § 156.00, William C. Donnino celebrated the addition of the 
 
51  Robert Hackett, States with the Most Fortune 500 Companies, CEO.COM, (June 15, 2015), 
http://fortune.com/2015/06/15/states-most-fortune-500-companies/. 
52  Id. 
53  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156.00 (LexisNexis 2018). 
54  Id. 
55  Id. 
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“actual notice” requirement to the offender, which repealed the presumption of 
notice.  He emphasizes the protections that the law provides, namely that “‘[i]t 
remains a defense to both ‘unauthorized use of a computer’ [N.Y. Penal Law 
§ 156.05] and ‘computer trespass’ [N.Y. Penal Law § 156.10] that ‘the defendant had 
reasonable grounds to believe that he had authorization to use the computer’ [N.Y. 
Penal Law § 156.50(1)].”56  Therefore, the statute focuses on assigning liability to 
instances of explicit contravention of password privacy mechanisms. 
2. Federal Computer Crime Statutes 
18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(5) of the DTSA states that “[e]xcept as expressly provided 
for under this subsection, nothing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize, 
or limit liability for, an act that is otherwise prohibited by law, such as the unlawful 
access of material by unauthorized means.”57  The primary federal statute implicated 
by the absence of guidance from the above provision is the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (“CFAA”).  Under this Act, anyone who “intentionally accesses a 
computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby 
obtains . . . information from any protected computer” is liable.58  The term 
“protected computer” is defined as a computer “which is used in or affecting 
interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located 
outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign 
commerce or communication of the United States.”59  To prove a violation of the 
CFAA, the plaintiff must show that the defendant: “(1) intentionally accessed a 
computer; (2) without authorization or exceeded authorized access; and (3) thereby 
obtained information from any protected computer if the conduct involved an 
interstate or foreign communication.”60  “Without authorization” under the CFAA 
includes exceeding the purposes for which access is authorized, and defines liability 
around limits placed on the use of information, even if the information or data may 
be obtained by permitted access to a computer system.61  Importantly, under the 
CFAA, it is not necessary that a defendant circumvents a technological access barrier 
to prove that they accessed a computer without authorization and violated the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”).62  The court in Cloudpath Networks v. 
SecureW2 B.V. affirmed this idea, reasoning (in alignment with the “Second, Fourth, 
and Ninth Circuits’ shared conclusion”) that the term “exceeds authorized access” 
under the CFAA applies to “individuals who are allowed to access a company 
computer but use that access to obtain data they are not allowed to see for any 
purpose.”63  
 
56  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156.00 practice cmt. (McKinney 2006). 
57  18 U.S.C.S § 1833(b)(5) (LexisNexis through Pub. L. No. 115-137). 
58  18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(2)(C) (2012). 
59  Id. § 1030 (e)(2)(B). 
60  15B AM. JUR. 2D Computers and the Internet § 248 (Westlaw 2018) (discussing accessing computer 
without authorization or exceeding authorized access). 
61  U.S. v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 (5th Cir. 2010). 
62  United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 103839 (9th Cir. 2015). 
63  Cloudpath Networks v. Securew2 B.V., 157 F. Supp. 3d 961, 983 (D. Colo. 2016). 
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Furthermore, in interpreting the CFAA, courts have focused on permission from 
the employer to limit liability.  Yet, the determination of whether an employer has 
given permission and an employee is without authorization or exceeds authorized 
access often turns on differences of opinion.64  In International Airport Centers v. 
Citrin, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that “an employee loses authorization to use a 
computer when the employee violates a state[‘s] . . . duty of loyalty [to his employer] 
because, based on common law agency principles, the employee’s actions terminated 
the employer–employee relationship ‘and with it his authority to access the 
[computer].’”65  However, in rejecting this view, the Ninth Circuit in U.S. v. Nosal 
reasoned that  
it is the action of the employer that determines whether an employee is 
authorized to access the computer, and that the only logical interpretation 
of the statutory phrase “exceeds authorized access” is that the employer 
has placed limitations on the employee’s “permission to use” the computer 
and the employee has violated—or “exceeded”—those limitations.66  
Yet in both interpretations, deference is given to the employer’s interests.  What 
results?  Employer insulation from whistleblowing activity, at the cost of society’s 
benefit from the reporting and disclosure of employer fraud.  
Overall, these interpretations result in the potential imposition of liability on 
employees who, although authorized to use a computer, discover information or data 
that their employers do not want them to, or do not give explicit permission to view.  
This undermines the purpose of whistleblowing immunity under the DTSA and strips 
the value of the whistleblowing function in society.  By simply designating specific 
data or documents that are accessible from an employee’s computer as private and 
unauthorized, employers can use the threat of liability under the CFAA to discourage 
employees who unintentionally uncover documents revealing fraud from reporting.  
Under the CFAA, broad liability results for whistleblowers because the scope of 
authorized access is defined by their employer.  Regardless of the DTSA immunity 
provision, this threat provides an enormous shield for employers and prevents 
necessary whistleblowing activity from happening in the first place.  
Additionally problematic for whistleblowers is the Circuit split involving broad 
and narrow interpretations of the CFAA’s phrases “without authorization” and 
“exceeds authorized access.”  In EF Cultural Travel B.V. v. Explorica, the First 
Circuit held that because an employee of a competing company violated his former 
employer’s confidentiality agreement, he “exceed[ed] authorized access” under the 
CFAA.67  In a troubling conclusion, the defendants in EF Cultural Travel were found 
 
64  15B AM. JUR. 2D Computers and the Internet § 248 (Westlaw 2018) (discussing accessing computer 
without authorization or exceeding authorized access). 
65  United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781, 787 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 
F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
66  Nosal, 642 F.3d at 787. 
67  EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 57984 (1st Cir. 2001). 
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liable under the CFAA for exceeding authorized access even though they did not in 
fact access anything unavailable to the general public.68  
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit found in International Airport Centers., LLC 
v. Citrin, that by principles of agency law, “an employee acted ‘without 
authorization’ [under the CFAA] as soon as the employee severed the agency 
relationship through disloyal activity.”69  Along with the standard in Citrin, a 
“violati[on] [of] the duty of loyalty, or failing to disclose adverse interests, voids the 
agency relationship.”70  The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits also apply a broad 
interpretation of access.71  
As a whole, these four circuits have interpreted the CFAA in slightly different 
factual scenarios, yet all have held that “the statutory terms ‘without authorization’ 
and/or ‘exceeds authorized access’ are broad enough to reach the situation in which 
an employee misuses employer information that he or she is otherwise permitted to 
access.”72  By relying on loyalty, confidentiality agreements, and agency principles, 
such a broad interpretation cripples whistleblowing and doles out liability for acting 
disloyal to an employer, even when acting disloyal may be in the best interest of 
society and will aid compliance with the law.  Alarmingly, the broad view of 
“exceeds authorized access” has recently become fixated on a violation of employer’s 
policy regarding access and use of computers, putting control over an employee’s 
whistleblowing activity in the hands of the potential violator.73 
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit was the first to repudiate the “broad” approach of 
the above mentioned circuits.74  The Ninth Circuit’s narrow approach explicitly 
refuses to use abstract agency theory to hold an employee liable.75  In LVRC Holdings 
LLC v. Brekka, the court held that whether the employee “exceeds authorized access” 
 
68  Id. at 579 (explaining that using a computer program called a scraper to glean necessary information 
off of EF’s public website exceeded authorized access). 
69  Am. Furukawa, Inc. v. Hossain, 103 F. Supp. 3d 864, 871 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (citing Int’l Airport Ctrs., 
LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
70  Citrin, 440 F.3d at 421 (citing State v. DiGiulio, 835 P.2d 488, 492 (Ariz. 1992)). 
71  Id. 
72  JBCHoldings NY, LLC v. Pakter, 931 F. Supp. 2d 514, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). See, e.g., United States 
v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 27172 (5th Cir. 2010) (employee “exceed[ed] authorized access” when he used 
employer information, to which he had access for other purposes, to perpetrate a fraud); United States v. 
Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 126364 (11th Cir. 2010) (employee “exceed[ed] his authorized access” when he 
accessed information for a non-business reason in violation of employer policy); Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420 (7th 
Cir. 2006) (based on principles of agency, employee’s authorization to use employer’s laptop ended once he 
violated duty of loyalty to employer, and  thus employee accessed computer “without authorization”); EF 
Cultural Travel, 274 F.3d at 58182  (disloyal employee “exceed[ed] authorized access” when he breached 
employer confidentiality agreement by helping competitor obtain proprietary information). 
73  See, e.g., John, 597 F.3d at 27173 (“While we do not necessarily agree that violating a confidentiality 
agree-ment . . . would give rise to criminal culpability, we do agree with the First Circuit that the concept of 
‘exceeds authorized access’ may include exceeding the purposes for which access is ‘authorized.’”); Rodriguez, 
628 F.3d at 1263; EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2003), 318 F.3d at 62 (“A lack 
of authorization could be established by an explicit statement . . . .”); see also United States v. Salum, 257 F. 
App’x 225, 230 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Teague, 646 F.3d 1119, 112122 (8th Cir. 2011). 
74  Am. Furukawa, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 864 (citing LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1134 
(9th Cir. 2009)). 
75  Id. 
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“depends on the actions taken by the employer.”76  As outlined above,77 this 
philosophy approaches (but does not match) the outlook of the California 
Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, because it suggests that an 
employer’s action to rescind the defendant’s right to use the computer is required to 
satisfy “without authorization.”  By placing emphasis on an employee acting in the 
face of his employer taking action to rescind his right to access, the Ninth Circuit 
indicates that actions synonymous with “hacking” would be a violation.  However, 
though this interpretation is more favorable than the First, Fifth, Seventh and 
Eleventh Circuit’s, it still does not clearly require hacking as under the CDAFA to 
breach “authorized access.” 
B. What Immunity Means for Whistleblowers in the Face of Litigation 
In the 2016 case Unum Group v. Loftus, the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Massachusetts interpreted Loftus’s assertion of immunity under the DTSA as an 
affirmative defense and emphasized that, “[a]s a general rule, a properly raised 
affirmative defense can be adjudicated on a motion to dismiss so long as (i) the facts 
establishing the defense are definitively ascertainable from the complaint and the 
other allowable sources of information.”78  Employee Loftus filed a motion to dismiss 
employer Unum’s claims for federal and state trade secret misappropriation.79  Loftus 
alleged that because he had turned over documents that he removed from his 
employer to his attorney in order to “report and investigate a violation of law,” he 
validly invoked the whistleblower immunity provision of the DTSA.80  The court 
denied Loftus’s motion, and reasoned that a defendant must present evidence to 
justify his immunity, specifically that “the record lack[ed] facts to support or reject 
his affirmative defense at this stage of litigation.  There has been no discovery to 
determine the significance of the documents taken or their contents . . . .”81  
Here, the court interpreted the immunity provision to be an affirmative defense, 
or “immunity from liability,” conditioned on the satisfaction of the requirements of 
the immunity provision, namely Sections 1833 (b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B).82  This is a 
convincing and well-founded analysis, as the text of the statute reads: “An individual 
shall not be held criminally or civilly liable under any Federal or State trade secret 
law” and continues to establish strict prerequisites.83  However, because of the 
suggestion of broad exemption from liability, it is tempting to interpret the text of 
Section (b)(1) to indicate an immunity from suit altogether.  One may argue that 
because the word “shall” is included to eliminate liability, Congress indicated 
 
76  Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1135. 
77  See p. 16, supra. 
78  220 F.Supp.3d 143, 147 (D.Mass. 2016) (quoting Rodi v. S. New England Sch. of Law, 389 F.3d 5, 12 
(1st Cir. 2004)). 
79  Unum, 220 F.Supp.3d at 146. 
80  Id. at 147. 
81  Id. 
82  Id. 
83  18 U.S.C.S § 1833(b)(1) et seq. (LexisNexis through Pub. L. No. 115-137). 
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mandatory exemption from liability, barring a lawsuit entirely.  Yet in truth, 
immunity is predicated upon the satisfaction of Sections (b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B).  
For example, in a public research paper titled Misconstruing Whistleblower 
Immunity Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, Peter S. Menell suggests that the 
immunity provision of the DTSA “extinguishes liability before litigation gets 
underway, just as a vaccine immunizes the patient against disease, and thus differs 
from a ‘defense’ to liability.”84  From a broad perspective, Menell’s argument aligns 
with the purpose of the DTSA to protect whistleblowers.  He emphasizes that the 
intent of Congress was to create a practical and tangible way to incentivize employees 
to proceed without fear of incurring legal expenses or other repercussions from 
serving as a “relator” under the False Claims Act.85  Yet, he fails to recognize that 
the authors of the immunity amendment to the DTSA did not seek boundless 
immunity, but a balance with the purpose of the rest of the statute and the protection 
it affords to employers’ trade secrets.  Menell argues that the DTSA’s “[i]mmunity 
is not a ‘mere defense’ to liability but an ‘immunity from suit,’” relying on the 2001 
Supreme Court case, Saucier v. Katz.86  However, Menell mistakes the immunity 
granted by the DTSA for the particularized legal concept of “qualified immunity,” 
which was the relevant law in Saucier v. Katz.  Justice Kennedy’s reasoning in 
Saucier, that the “[t]he privilege is ‘an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense 
to liability’” is in the context of qualified immunity, which is limited to government 
officials.87 Qualified immunity “protects a government official from lawsuits alleging 
that the official violated a plaintiff’s rights.”88  
To determine the point at which a motion asserting immunity can defeat a 
pending claim in litigation, sufficient support must be made for any preconditions 
required by the statute for immunity to apply.  Therefore, it follows that the depth of 
factual inquiry into the prerequisites to immunity, as required by the statute, matter.  
In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court established a two-part test for whether a 
government official is entitled to qualified immunity: first, “a court must look at 
whether the facts indicate that a constitutional right has been violated,” and if so, then 
second, “a court must then look at whether that right was clearly established at the 
time of the alleged conduct.”89  Unique to qualified immunity (as opposed to 
immunity provisions generally) is that satisfaction of preconditions can be more 
easily determined from facts set out in the complaint; therefore, a judge may have 
sufficient evidence at that point in litigation to grant or deny the motion to dismiss.  
This is so because preconditions for qualified immunity, described by the two-part 
Saucier test are often simpler inquiries.  Furthermore, facts indicating that a 
constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct in most 
 
84  Peter S. Menell., Misconstruing Whistleblower Immunity Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 1 NEV. 
L. J. F. 92, 93 (2017). 
85  Id. 
86  Id. (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)). 
87  Saucier, 533 U.S. at 20001; see also Am. Jur. 3d, Proof of Qualified Immunity Defense in 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1983 or Bivens Actions Against Law Enforcement Officers § 1 (Westlaw 2018). 
88  Qualified Immunity, CORNELL L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/qualified_immunity (last visited Apr. 14, 2018). 
89  Id.; see also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 194. 
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cases is also easily ascertainable from a complaint, given that it satisfies Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  In other words, Rule 12(b)(6) has 
likely done concurrent work to ensure that the complaint states a claim on which 
relief can be granted.  In turn, this would make it likely that the complaint is sufficient 
to answer whether the plaintiff alleges a violation of rights, whether the defendant is 
a government official, and whether this right was clearly established at the time of 
alleged violation of rights.90  Therefore, a motion to dismiss based on qualified 
immunity likely does not require additional evidence and can be a defense to suit 
entirely at the motion to dismiss stage of litigation (consistent with Justice Kennedy’s 
reasoning of qualified immunity as a defense to stand trial, not just an affirmative 
defense that happens later after evidence is set forth). 
In contrast, in Unum v. Loftus, the U.S. District Court denied an employee’s 
motion to dismiss his employer’s DTSA claim, holding that a defendant under the 
DTSA must present evidence to justify the immunity.91  The court reasoned that 
entitlement to the immunity provision as an affirmative defense must be established 
by the defendant.92  Under the DTSA, a defendant must show that the trade secret 
disclosure: “(A) is made (i) in confidence to a Federal, State, or local government 
official, either directly or indirectly, or to an attorney; and (ii) solely for the purpose 
of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of law; or (B) is made in a 
complaint or other document filed in a lawsuit or other proceeding, if such filing is 
made under seal.”93  In Unum, the preconditions to immunity laid out in the text of 
Section 1833(b) were not simply a matter of checking boxes, but rather an intensive 
and fact-based inquiry.  
Inquiring as to the purpose of a defendant’s actions is no small task.  Proving a 
defendant’s purpose in taking an action ex post is clearly an all-encompassing factual 
question.  Because of the need for evidence to support the necessary conditions for 
immunity under the DTSA, it is incorrect to criticize Unum v. Loftus as Menell does.  
To show that Section (A)(ii) is satisfied would require a particularly detailed inquiry 
into the purpose of the defendant in turning over documents.  As the court explains,  
it is not ascertainable from the complaint whether Loftus turned over all of 
Unum’s documents to his attorney, which documents he took and what 
information they contained, or whether he used, is using, or plans to use, 
those documents for any purpose other than investigating a potential 
violation of law.94   
Therefore, the court’s decision to deny the motion to dismiss because of the need 
to attain more evidence to justify his immunity was proper and necessary given the 
statutory text. 
 
90  Id. 
91  Unum Grp. v. Loftus, 220 F.Supp.3d 143, 147 (D.Mass. 2016) 
92  Id. 
93  18 U.S.C.S § 1833(b)(1) (LexisNexis through Pub. L. No. 115-137). 
94  Unum, 220 F.Supp.3d at 147. 
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Although not “immunity from suit” as Justice Kennedy suggests in Saucier, the 
“immunity from liability” upon proof of justification laid out in Unum aligns with 
the purpose of the DTSA.  As explained above, the purpose of the DTSA was not to 
entirely insulate whistleblowers, but to strike a balance between protecting legitimate 
ownership of trade secrets and protecting important law enforcement activities by 
safeguarding whistleblowers.  Immunity from suit, as Menell suggests, would 
mistakenly allow those hunting for their employer’s unlawful activities to slip 
through the cracks and escape liability. 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
All things considered, immunity from trade secret misappropriation as it 
currently exists in the DTSA is not enough to motivate legitimate whistleblowing 
activity.  Immunity should not be predicated on the absence of conduct that violates 
the CFAA, when the broad scope of liability under the CFAA flies in the face of the 
purpose of the DTSA immunity provision.  This would greatly confuse employees 
who are urged by Congress to act while simultaneously walk a thin rope that may 
lead to their own criminal or civil penalties.   
To provide a necessary supplement, two amendments to the DTSA, consisting 
of 1) a third necessary condition to receiving immunity and 2) an extension of 
immunity to cover the CFAA, should be adopted.  In addition to the existing pre-
conditions to immunity,95 a third element must define the scope of lawful access 
directly and describe the outer bounds of employee liability to which the immunity 
would apply.  Following the lead of state computer crime law, this amendment should 
require that the employee did not engage in fishing expeditions or “hack” an 
information system.  Most critically, the immunity must also be extended to federal 
computer access laws, upon satisfaction of the scope requirements.  By implementing 
these requirements directly in the statute, the DTSA would finally have the effect the 
authors intended: to balance the need for trade secret protection with whistleblower 
protection. 
Without these amendments, the fear of the CFAA’s broad liability will put a 
potential whistleblower back in the very position he or she was before the DTSA: 
paralyzed by the likelihood of a claim under the employer-friendly CFAA.  If a third 
necessary condition to immunity is added to the statute requiring that employees did 
not search past a certain scope of access, the federal government will be in the best 
position to protect legitimate whistleblowing only, as immunity will not extend to 
acts like hacking. 
Because of the changing landscape of intellectual property and the popularity of 
trade secrets as a choice means of protection, reshaping the law to bar employers 
from using the threat of trade secret litigation to hide fraudulent activity is critical.  A 
definition by the legislature of the scope of access within the text of the DTSA itself, 
 
95  18 U.S.C.S § 1833(b)(1) (LexisNexis through Pub. L. No. 115-137) (Requiring that “the disclosure of 
a trade secret [be] made 1.) in confidence to a Federal, State, or local government official, either directly or 
indirectly, or to an attorney; and 2) solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of 
law” or under seal in a complaint). 
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coupled with an extension of immunity to federal computer crime law, is essential.  
Not only would both of these amendments carry out the intent of Congress, but they 
would also assure whistleblowers when coming forward and prevent unbounded 
employee “fishing expeditions.”  
Moreover, if the Defend Trade Secrets Act does not adopt an amendment that 
defines the scope of access under immunity, a judicial solution to narrow how courts 
define “exceeds authorized access” is necessary.  Specifically, circuit courts should 
interpret the CFAA to impose liability only on acts falling under the narrower view, 
requiring something analogous to hacking as laid out by the Ninth Circuit in Brekka.  
CONCLUSION 
The whistleblower immunity provision of the Defend Trade Secrets Act was 
included to “tackle a broader social justice program” involving the use of trade secret 
law and nondisclosure agreements (“NDAs”) by employers to prevent employees 
from reporting fraud or illegal activity.96  When President Obama signed the Defend 
Trade Secrets Act of 2016 and its whistleblower immunity amendment into law, a 
departure from past practices was on the horizon.  The shift to trade secrets as a 
commonplace form of intellectual property protection and their wide use across 
companies heightened the potential for disclosure in a variety of whistleblowing 
circumstances.  To combat fear and hesitation on the part of employees who discover 
information indicating employer fraud, the immunity provision granted a sweeping 
immunity from state and federal trade secret misappropriation claims.  Without such 
immunity, the threat of impending litigation for trade secret misappropriation acted 
as a distinct roadblock in employee disclosure.  
However, the DTSA has failed to make a legitimate dent in the larger roadblock 
of liability that employees face vis à vis computer access laws.  Although state 
statutes in California and New York protect legitimate whistleblowing by requiring 
more malicious activity such as “hacking” to find liability, unfavorable federal 
statutes are just as easily accessible to employers.  The requirement of hacking in 
many state statutes will punish those embarking on fishing expeditions to uncover 
potential fraud, while simultaneously protecting those who access incriminating data 
through the course of employment.  
The intent of the legislature in drafting the immunity provision was to reassure 
and encourage employees who happen upon an employer’s misconduct to do the right 
thing by disclosing it to the government.  Without clarification of the scope of 
computer access that immunity covers and extension of immunity to federal 
computer law, through an amendment to the DTSA, the provision is a false sense of 
security.  To solve this problem, a third necessary condition to immunity under the 
DTSA, requiring that employees do not search past a certain scope of access, will put 
employees and employers in the best position to motivate good behavior of corporate 
officers and protect legitimate whistleblowing only.  The purpose of the 
whistleblower immunity regime is clear: trade secret law and state non-disclosure 
 
96  Menell, supra note 84, at 92. 
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agreements may not be used to hide allegedly illegal conduct or discourage 
investigation of such matters. 
 
 
